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THE purchase and sale in the open market of government and
corporate bonds, treasury notes, and the acceptances and notes
of persons of established and widely known credit standing is
an important part of the business of a commercial bank. But
the greater number and volume of its transactions are the bor-
rowing, the lending and the agreeing to lend money at short
term. The majority of such transactions are with persons who
deal regularly with the bank. The transactions with each cus-
tomer are numerous. They take a great variety of forms. Dur-
ing a single day a bank may receive on account of a customer
many distinct advances of money. Some of the advances are pay-
ments received from the obligors of bills, notes and checks left
with the bank for collection; some are money received as the
price of securities left with the bank for sale; some are received
from other banks by means of cable and letter transfers; others
are advances made by the customer himself. Each of these ad-
vances either creates an obligation or affects an already existing
one. But what obligation is created or which existing obliga-
tions are affected is not always clear. In exchange for some of
the advances the customer receives a time or demand certificate
of deposit; for some, credit on his "savings account"; for some,
bank notes; for another, a traveler's letter of credit. But in the
case of others the bank makes no express promise. On the same
day the bank may make equally numerous advances for the ac-
count of the same customer. Some are made against the cus-
tomer's checks to third persons; some, under letters of credit;
some, in pursuance of instructions to make cable transfers;
some, for securities purchased for the customer; some, upon the
presentment of the customer's notes and acceptances; and others
are advances to the customer himself. Each of these advances
either creates an obligation of the customer or extinguishes in
whole or in part an existing obligation of the bank. But in
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instances in which there is no express bargain between bank and
customer at the time of the advance-and this is usually the
case-what obligations are created or extinguished is not clear.
There are other types of transactions between bank and cus-
tomer which are perhaps more important than those which have
been mentioned. None of them is an advance; they are agree-
ments to make advances. One is the loan or discount for a cus-
tomer of his or another's note or bill. Another is the issuance
of a letter of credit against the customer's express promise to
put the bank in funds or to reimburse it. These transactions
differ from those which have been enumerated in that they result
in placing an obligation upon both bank and customer. But such
of them as are loans or discounts are like some of the advances
enumerated in that the bargain is not expressed but must be
implied in fact. Loans or discounts are, therefore, peculiar both
in that the bargain must be implied in fact and in that the bar-
gain is bilateral, obligating both bank and customer.'
Thus, at any particular moment it would not be surprising to
find a bank under a number of discrete obligations to the same
customer and the customer likewise obligated to the bank by
virtue of several distinct bargains. For example, the bank has
issued to him its certificate of deposit, its cashier's check, and
its letter of credit; and the balance of mutual advances which
were not accompanied by express promises is in favor of the
customer. The customer is bound to reimburse the bank under
a letter of credit agreement which he has signed; and he is the
borrower in a loan or discount transaction.
In the situation existing at such a moment, in so far as the
bargains were express agreements, the time of performance,
amount and direction of the obligation resulting from each of
them is fixed by reference to its terms. But in so far as the sev-
eral transactions were not accompanied by express agreements
the time of performance, amount and direction of the obligation
are found in the bargain implied in fact from the regular course
of business. In many situations it will appear that in all of the
transactions between bank and customer the bargain must be
implied in fact. These may, and in order to facilitate analysis
I Moore and Sussman, Legal and Institutional Methods Applied to the
Debiting of Direct Discounts-I. Legal Method: Banker's Set-off (1931) 40
YALE L. J. 381, 389-400.
"It appears, therefore, that by taking the credit instrument [note] to
state the customer's side of the bargain a sensible bargain cannot be con-
structed. Whether the implied-in-fact promise of the bank be assumed to
be unlimited or limited in point of time, unconditional or conditional, the
bargain and the legal consequences conforming to its terms would be absurd.
"It is necessary, therefore, to look for the customer's promise outside the
promissory note. Both sides of the bargain must be implied in fact." Id. at
393.
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will, be separated into two groups: those which do not include
loan or discount transactions, and those which do.
In situations of the first type, all the transactions, it will be
observed, are either those in which the bank has made advances
of money to the customer or those in which the customer has
made advances of money to the bank. The transactions of a single
customer will serve as an example. At the beginning of the
month the books of the bank showed an excess of receipts over
disbursements on each of the three ledger accounts which regu-
larly serve to record the deposits and the payments against
checks which are earmarked for one or another of them; the
ledger which records transactions not so earmarked also showed
an excess of receipts over disbursements. During the month the
bank received the purchase price of securities left by the cus-
tomer for sale; received payment of a note and mortgage left
for collection; collected checks, notes and bills drawn upon or
payable at other banks; received cable transfers; and received
from time to time either from the customer, or from third per-
s6ns for his account, coin and Federal Reserve notes. Some of
these receipts were earmarked for particular ledger records and
others were not. During the same period the bank made dis-
bursements against checks, paid notes and acceptances of the
customer, made cable transfers upon the customer's instructions
and handed coin and bank notes to the customer upon his per-
sonal demands. All of the disbursements against checks and some
but not all of the others were earmarked for one or another of
the three ledger accounts.
Each of these receipts, whether or not earmarked for one or
another of the three ledger accounts, was a loan by customer to
bank and each disbursement, whether earmarked or not, a loan
by bank to customer. Each advance, were it an isolated trans-
action, would result in an obligation on the part of the borrower
to pay the lender an equivalent sum. But since each loan was
one of a series of reciprocal advances of money made in the
regular course of business between bank and customer the obli-
gation imposed on bank or customer is not to pay a sum equiva-
lent to the sum lent, but to pay the difference between the total of
the amounts borrowed and the total of the amounts lent. Such
a series of advances between bank and customer is called a cur-
rent account. The balance of the current account, i.e., the differ-
ence between the sum of advances by bank and the sum of ad-
vances by customer, determines the direction and amount of the
obligation to pay;- The obligation to pay is performed only by
2 LANGDELL, A BR=IE SuRVEy OF EQunTy JURISDICTION (2d ed. 1903) 114-
116; Moore and Shamos, Interest on the Balances of Checking Accounts
(1927) 27 COL. L. Rnv. 633-634; Moore and Sussman, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 386-389.
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the payment of the adverse balance; the payment of a lesser sum
is a loan. Although there is always an obligation on one or the
other to pay the balance of the current account, the party so
obligated may or may not be under an obligation to make loans.
The obligation to lend, if it exists at all, depends, as in the case
of the checking account, on an express or implied-in-fact bargain
which is quite distinct from the implied-in-fact bargain control-
ling the obligation to pay the balance of the current account.
It is the balance of all the advances on the current account,
whether or not they are earmarked for particular ledger ac-
counts, which determines the direction and amount of thetobliga-
tion to pay.4 Usually the amount of the obligation to lend is also
determined by the balance of the current account but sometimes
the agreement stipulates some other measure.6 The obligation to
lend is commonly but not always performed by honoring the
checks of the customer for amounts less than or equal to the total
amount of the obligation to lend. It will be observed that the
obligation to lend differs from the obligation to pay the balance
in respect of the damages recoverable for its breach and may
differ in respect of amount. In the ordinary case in which the
dealings between bank and customer continue or are expected
to continue the obligation to pay the balance of the current ac-
count is rarely performed. Usually the bank has made an im-
plied-in-fact promise to lend by honoring the customer's checks.
The bank's obligation to honor checks is so necessary an adjunct
of the business activities of the customer that he regularly makes
loans to the bank though he has not agreed to do so. It is only
by making such loans, earmarked or not, depending on the under-
standing with the bank, that he can require the bank to continue
to honor checks. It appears, therefore, that in the first type of
situation in which there is no express bargain the determination
of the amount of the obligation of bank or customer to pay the
balance and the direction in which it runs (whatever may be
said of the obligation 'to lend) is simply a matter of computing
the difference between the sums of the two series of advances.
* In the second type of situation in which there is no express
3 Robinson v. The Oriental Bank, 3 Vict. L. R. 177 (1872); Steward v.
Bank of Australasia, 9 Vict. L. R. 240 (1883); McNight v. Bank of Acadia,
114 La. 289, 38 So. 172 (1905); Simmons Hardware Co. v. Bank of Green-
wood, 41 S. C. 177, 19 S. E. 502 (1894).
4Bailey v. Finch, 7 L. R. Q. B. 34 (1871) ; Garnett v. McKewan, L. R. 8
Exch. 10 (1872); Buckingham & Co. v. London & Midland Bank, 12 T. L.
R. 70 (1895); Advance Exchange'Bank v. Baldwin, 224 Mo. App. 616, 31
S. W. (2d) 96 (1930); Delano v. Equitable Trust Co., 110 Misc. 704, 181
N. Y. Supp. 852 (1920) pleadings reported in full in 40 YALE L. J. 1255-
1262 (1931); Coburn v. Carstarphen, 194 N. C. 368, 139 S. E. 596 (1927);
Jones v. Carolina National Bank, 114 S. C. 11, 103 S. E. 27 (1920). See
also, Cumming v. Shand, 29 L. J. Ex (N. S.) 129 (1860).
5 Bransby v. East London Bank, 14 L. T. (N. S.) 403 (1866).
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bargain the transactions include loans and discounts as well as
mutual advances. In a loan or discount the bank receives from
its customer either his own note payable to the bank or a bill or
note made by a third person and indorsed by the customer. Such
transactions are commonly analogized to open market purchases
and thought of as implied-in-fact bargains for the purchase and
sale of the note, but it is clear that they are nothing of the sort.0
The implied-in-fact bargain pursuant to which the note is deliv-
ered to the bank is one in which the bank-not in exchange for
a quid pro quo but in exchange for a promise-promises during
a period of time to pay or to lend up to the amount of the note.
This promise is for an amount over and above the sum which
it is already obligated to pay or to lend by virtue of mutual
advances.7 The customer, on the other hand, promises to pay, at
the end of that period, the amount of the debit balance of the
current account and pledges the note with the bank as collateral
security for his obligation to pay that amount. If a time note
is given the loan period expires at the maturity of the note; if
a demand note, upon notice." "The bank promises and is obligated
to lend the agreed amount until the expiration of the agreed
period and the customer promises and is obligated to pay at the
end of that period the amount by which the transfers of the bana
exceed his transfers to it. The customer's promissory note plays
the part of collateral security for the customer's obligation. This
it can do, because, though it does not subject the customer to a
duty to pay the bank, the bank acquires a privileged power to
pledge or discount-repledge or rediscount-it for its own obliga-
tions. The note transaction is, therefore, in substance the fa-
miliar British device for extending bank credit for definite
periods by means of a bargain between bank and customer
obligating the bank to honor the customer's overdrafts up to a
1BMoore and Sussman, op. cit. supra note 1, at 389-400.
7Westeson v. Olathe State Bank, 71 Colo. 102, 204 Pac. 329 (1922)
note); Eleopfer v. First Nat. Bank, 65 Kan. 774, 70 Pac. 880 (1902)
(note); Armfield v. London and Westminster Bank, 1 Cab. & E. 170 (1883)
(check); Burke v. Colonial Bank of New Zealand, 14 N. Z. 146 (1879)
(check); Freeman v. Standard Bank of South Africa, T. H. 26 (1905)
(check); Dirnfeld v. Fourteenth Street Savings Bank, 37 App. D. C. 11
(1911) (check). See also, Dawson v. Bank of New Zealand, 3 N. S. W. 154,
386 (1884) ; Murphy v. Hanna, 37 N. D. 156, 164 N. W. 32 (191T) ; Farabee-
Treadwell Co. v. Union & Planters' Bank & Trust Co., 135 Tenn. 208, 186
S. W. 92 (1916) ; Merchants' Bank of Canada v. Sims, 122 Wash. 106, 209
Pac. 1113 (1922).
s See Delano v. Equitable Trust Co., supra note 4; Shuman v. Citizens
State Bank of Rugby, 27 N. D. 599, 147 N. W. 388 (1914); Goldstein v.
Jefferson Title & Trust Co., 95 Pa. Super. Ct. 167 (1928); and Callaham
v. Bank of Anderson, 69 S. C. 374, 48 S. E. 293 (1904) which are dis-
cussed in Moore and Sussman, op. cit. supra note 1. See also Dawson v.
Bank of New Zealand, supra note 7.
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stated amount during a stated period and obligating the customer
to pay the debit balance at the end of that period." "a
Although this type of situation has been distinguished because
it includes mutual promiseg, as a matter of course both bank and
customer continue to make advances during the agreed period
so that at its end the amount of the obligation to pay and its
direction are determined in the same way as in the situation in
which all the transactions are advances. "But throughout the
agreed period both bank and customer are obligated.
The notion that the implied-in-fact bargain upon the loan or
discount of a note is not an agreement to lend expiring at the
end of the agreed period but a purchase is perhaps more insistent
if the instrument which the bank has discounted be the bill, note
or acceptance of a third person indorsed by the customer. Those
who entertain this notion make two points. The first is that if
the note is paid by the maker at maturity the amount of the
bank's obligation to the discounting customer remains the same
as before payment. Therefore it cannot be contended that the
obligation of the bank arising by virtue of the loan or discount
expired at maturity. But the 'conclusion that the amount of the
bank's obligation has not diminished need not be derived from
tle proposition that the loan or discount imposed an obligation
on the bank as purchaser to pay the price. It may equally well,
and for the sake of logical simplicity should, be derived from the
proposition that the note was taken by the bank as security for
an obligation to pay the debit balance at the end of the agreed
period. If the bank is a pledgee, then, the payment of the note
by the third person was an advance to the bank for the account
of the customer which increased the balance of the current ac-
count by an amount equal to the amount by which the expiration
of the loan agreement diminished it., Their second point is that
if the note is not paid by the maker the customer is not obligated
to the bank by virtue of the loan or discount unless he has in-
dorsed and then only as indorser upon due presentment and
timely notice of dishonor. But this point cannot be sustained.
It is true no action may be maintained against the customer as
indorser unless he has indorsed and the necessary steps upon
dishonor have been taken. But he is obligated to pay the debit
balance of the current account at the expiration of the loan
period. And this obligation is wholly independent of his obliga-
tion as indorser. Indeed it is imposed upon him even in the cases
in which he has not indorsed or has indorsed "without re-
Sa Moore and Sussman, op. cit. supra note 1, at 393.
9 See, for example, National Commercial Bank v. Miller & Co., 77 Ala.
168 (1884); Lyons v. Union Exchange Nat. Bank of New York, 160 App.
Div. 493, 135 N. Y. Supp. 121 (1912).
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course." 10 Perhaps the idea that the bank's failure to present
and give notice to the customer discharges him is the result of
confusing the situation with one in which there are indorsers
obligated to the customer. In such a case it may be that failure
to present and give notice to the prior indorsers, or any other
conduct on the part of the bank which would impair the value
of the collateral, would discharge pro tmnto the customer's obli-
gation to pay the debit balance.P
Upon the sequestration of the assets of an insolvent commer-
cial bank the receiver, who is charged with their liquidation and
distribution, will find that they fall into two groups. The first
includes the assets which will be liquidated by sale; the second,
those which will be liquidated by collection. In the first, in addi-
tion to money in the till, land, buildings and tangible chattels
owned by the bank, are govenment and corporate bonds and ac-
ceptances and notes of persons of established and widely known
credit standing bought in the open market. The second includes
obligations of customers acquired in transactions with them and
obligations of persons, sometimes but usually not customers,
also acquired for the most part in transactions with customers.
Similarly the liabilities of the insolvent estate will appear to fall
into two classes: those to customers and those to others arising
out of transactions with customers; and liabilities to others aris-
ing out of transactions with persons who are not customers. The
liquidation by sale on the open market of assets of the first group
and the liquidation by collection of obligations of third persons
which were not acquired from customers do not present difficult
legal questions. Neither does the determination of the amounts
of the liabilities to third persons which do not arise out of trans-
actions with customers.
But in the case of obligations and of liabilities arising out of
transactions with customers the determination of the amount
which the receiver may collect or the amount which the customer
may prove sometimes presents difficulties and sometimes does
10 STEAD, BA-KExs ADvANcES 8; Burke v. Colonial Bank of New Zealand,
svpra note 7 (semble); Davies & Vincent v. Bank of Commerce, 27 Ariz.
276, 232 Pac. 880 (1925); Lyon v. County State Bank v. Schaefer, 102 Ran.
868, 171 Pac. 1159 (1918); cf. Mudd v. Farmers' and Merchants' Bank of
Hunnewell, 175 Mo. App. 398, 162 S. W. 314 (1913) in which there was
an express bargain for purchase.
IE See, for example, Aebi v. Bank of Evansville, 124 Wis. 73 (1905); Taft
v. Quinsigamond Nat. Bank, 172 Mass. 363, 52 N. E. 387 (1899). If there
are no prior indorsers but the debtor is the drawer of a check given to the
creditor for the debt, the creditor's failure to present does not discharge
the debtor beyond the amount of the ensuing loss occasioned by the want
of presentment. Farmers' Oil & Gas Co. v. Betts, 50 S. . 78, 208 N. W.
402 (1926); Grange v. Reigh, 93 Wis. 552, 67 N. W. 1130 (1896). See also
McCrary v. Carrington, 35 Ala. 698 (1860); Kephart v. Butcher, 17 Iowa
240 (1864).
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not. If the obligation or liability arose from a single transaction
which included the express promise of customer or of bank the
determination is easy since the express promise is controlling.
Again if the obligation or liability is for the credit or debit bal-
ance of the current account and the only transactions have been
advances no serious problems are presented. But if there are
cross obligations arising from a loan or discount or cross obliga-
tions resulting from several distinct transactions then the deter-
mination in these situations of the amount which the receiver
may collect or the amount for which the customer may prove
does require the careful distinction of one type of situation from
another, minute analyses of each and precise discrimination in
the choice and application of legal rules. It is with these situa-
tions that this article is concerned.
Receiver and Customer Who Is Maker of Matured Note
Amonig the most often recurring situations is the one in which
the receiver finds among the assets a matured note or a demand
note received by way of loan or discount from a customer between
whom and the bank there has also been a series of mutual ad-
vances of money made iii the regular course of business. Neither
in the loan or discount nor in the case of any of the advances
was there an express agreement defining the obligation of the
palties though there may in connection with some of the ad-
vances have been an implied-in-fact bargain to honor checks. The
transactions were recorded in the single individual ledger account
in which all the transactions were recorded, or in one of the
several accounts if more than one set of individual records were
kept for the customer. A credit entry for the amount of the note
was made, and perhaps on or after the day of maturity a debit
entry. At least one of the accounts shows a book or apparent
"credit balance" but in fact the balance of the current account
may be either in credit, in debit, or in balance.
In respect of such a situation it will be recalled, first, that the
series of mutual advances of money constituted a current account
which by itself and quite independent of the loan or discount im-
posed upon the bank the obligation to pay the credit balance and
upon the customer the obligation to pay the debit balance; sec-
ondly, that the loan and discount is not a transaction upon the
current account notwithstanding its deceptive dntry on the indi-
vidual ledger card as a credit along with the advances of money
received from the bank; thirdly, that the obligations arising
from the loan or discount depend upon the implied-in-fact bar-
gain made at the time of the loan. The obligation imposed on
the bank is to lend the amount of the note (less the discount)
plus the credit balance or minus the debit balance of the current
1116 [Vol. 41
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account during the period ending with the maturity of the note
if a time note, or if it be a demand note, during a period termi-
nating upon notice. The obligation imposed on the customer is
to pay the debit balance of the current account at the expiration
of the agreed period and the note is security for that obligation.
Coincidentally with the maturity of the note, or the notice, the
obligation of the bank to lend the agreed amount expires by its
terms; the obligation of the customer to pay becomes due if there
is a debit balance of the current account, or is performed if there
is a credit balance.
The sequestration of the assets upon the insolvency of the
bank (whatever its effect may have been upon the obligation to
lend) has done no more than convert the bank's obligation to
pay the credit balance, if any, into a claim in favor of the cus-
tomer for a distributive share of the assets. The customer con-
tinues as before to be obligated to pay the debit balance. The
same rules which determined the direction and amount of the
obligation of bank or customer before the sequestration of assets
control the direction of the obligation or liability and measure
its amount. As before the sequestratioif, the face of the note does
not measure the obligation.
Thus, if the advances by customer exceeded the advances by
bank, i.e., if there were a credit balance of the current account,
the receiver, even in an action at law on the note, may not re-
cover against the customer ' but the customer has a provable
claim against the insolvent estate for the credit balance.13 If the
current account is in balance then neither has the receiver a
right nor the customer a claim. The note, which was held as
security for a debit balance which did not and under the circum-
stances will not come into existence, must be returned to the
customer. 4 These conclusions follow whether all of the advances
were recorded in a single ledger account, or whether some were
Hammons v. Grant, 26 Ariz. 344, 225 Pac. 485 (1924); Steelman v.
Atchley, 98 Ark. 294, 135 S. W. 902 (1911); People v. California Safe De-
posit & Trust Co., 168 Cal. 241, 141 Pac. 1181 (1914) ; First Nat. Bank of
Rocky Ford v. Lewis, 57 Colo. 124, 139 Pac. 1102 (1914) (scmblc); Lippitt
v. Thames Loan & Trust Co., 88 Conn. 185, 90 Atl. 369 (1914); State v.
Brobston, 94 Ga. 95, 21 S. E. 146 (1894); Meyer v. Hiatt, 40 Ga. App. 583,
150 S. E. 567 (1929); Miles v. Bossert, 173 N. E. 656 (Ind. App. 1930);
Bodley v. Bowman, 293 Pac. 740 (Kan. 1930) (scm ble); Beatty v. Scudday,
10 La. Ann. 404 (1855); Bernstein v. Coburn, 49 Neb. 734, 08 N. W. 1021
(1896); In the Matter of Van Allen, 37 Barb. 225 (N. Y. 1861); Coburn v.
Carstarphen, supra note 4; Bank of Woodward v. Robertson, 111 Okla. 58,
238 Pac. 844 (1925); Upham v. Bramwell, 105 Ore. 597, 209 Pac. 100
(1922). Contra.: Armstrong v. Helm, 13 Ky. Law 460 (1891).
23 Steelman v. Atchley; People v. California Safe Deposit Co.; Bank of
Woodward v. Robertson, all supra note 12; Coburn v. Carstarphen, cupra
note 4.
34 Steelman v. Atchley, gupra note 12.
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recorded in one and some in others of several ledger accounts.5
They also follow if advances, which by virtue of express bar-
gains do not affect the balance of the current account, were
entered in one or another of the ledger accounts recording ad-
vances which do not affect that balance. 1
If, on the other hand, the advances by bank exceeded the ad-
vances by customer, i.e., if there were a debit balance of the
current account, the receiver has a cause of action against the
customer for the debit balance whether it be more or less than
the note,:1 and may retain the note until the debit balance is paid.
Moreover, if the receiver hold more than one of the customer's
notes he may retain all of them notwithstanding the customer's
demand though the face amount of any one exceed the debit bal-
ance.48 The customer, however, may redeem the note or notes by
paying the debit balance. 9
To be contrasted with the rules prescribing the legal conse-
quences of the loan or discount are the rules as to set-off of
independent causes of action which are derived from the decisions
and statutes regulating the administration of insolvent estates
and from the ordinary sthtutes as to set-ofts and counterclaims.
The former define the legal relations of lending bank and bor-
rowing customer who have not made an express bargain at the
time of loan or discount. At the maturity of the loan agreement
either bank or customer, but not both, are obligated to pay. The
latter presuppose two distinct bargains, one obligating bank to
customer and the other customer to bank. They provide when
one of the obligations may not, when it may, and when it must be
set off against the other. Between receiver and customer the
doctrine of set-off is applicable, for example, when all the ad-
15 Bailey v. Finch, supra note 4; Advance Exchange Bank v. Baldwin,
supra note 4; Coburn v. Carstarphen, supra note 4; and see supra note 4.
16 Prudential Realty Co. v. Allen, 241 Mass. 277, 135 N. E. 221 (1922).
17 Adams v. Spokane Drug Co., 57 Fed. 888 (1893); Stapylton v. Cie des
Phosphates de France, 88 Fed. 53 (1893) (customer's own bill); Ellerbo
v. Studebaker Corp. of America, 21 F. (2d) 993 (1927) (semblo); Funk v.
Young, 138 Ark. 38, 210 S. W. 143 (1919) ; Lippitt v. Thames Loan & Trust
Co., supra note 12; Robinson v. Aird, 43 Fla. 30, 29 So. 633 (1901); State
v. Brobston, supra note 12; Third Swedish M. E. Church v. Wetherell, 43
Ill. App. 414 (1891); Love v. Lewis, 141 Miss. 120, 106 So. 358 (1925);
Advance Exchange Bank v. Baldwin, supra note 4; Williams v. Johnson,
50 Mont. 7, 144 Pac. 768 (1914); Miller v. Receiver of Franklin Bank, 1
Paige 444 (N. Y. 1829) ; In the Matter of Van Allen, supra note 12; Clots v.
Bently, 5 Albany L. J. 286 (N. Y. 1872); Tourtelot v. Whitted, 9 N. D.
467, 84 N. W. 8 (1900); Upham v. Bramwell, supra note 12; Laubach v.
Leibert, 87 Pa. 55 (1878); Jones v. Piening, 85 Wis. 264, 55 N. W. 413
(1893). Contra: Hughes v. Garrett, 150 Ark. 404, 234 S. W. 265 (1921).
is Armstrong v. Helm, supra note 12; Allen v. Abramson, 245 Mass. 321,
139 N. E. 648 (1923). Contra: Hughes v. Garrett, supra note 17.
'9 Taylor v. Cox, 40 S. W. (2d) 444 (Ark. 1931); People v. St. Nicholas
Bank of New York, 76 Hun 522, 28 N. Y. Supp. 114 (1894).
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vances were made pursuant to express bargains to repay the
advance and none, therefore, affected the balance of a current
account; or when bank and customer have severally purchased
from third persons in the open market the obligations of the
other. The customer holds the insolvent bank's certificate of de-
posit, its bank note, its acceptance, its letter of credit, a claim
for a time deposit in the form of a "savings account" or any
other obligation of the bank resulting from an express bargain
to pay a fixed sum. The receiver holds the customer's note and
mortgage upon which the bank had made an advance by way of
loan which by express agreement is not to affect the balance of
a current account; the customer's matured obligation to reim-
burse for advances under a letter of credit; the note, acceptance
or warrant of the customer bought in the open market; or any
other obligation of the customer resulting from an express bar-
gain to pay a fixed sum. lay or must the matured obligation of
one be set off against the matured obligation of the other? Had
the two creditors not been in the relation of bank and customer
it would be clear enough that in an insolvent administration
under most circumstances the matured claims of one would be
set off against those of the other. That they were bank and
customer does not make the claims less available as set-offs.:0
Generally their availability is determined by statutes and deci-
sions which have no peculiar application to insolvent banks.
Obviously among the instances in which between receiver and
customer independent causes of action are set off should be in-
cluded the common case in which the bank or customer is obli-
gated to pay the balance of the current account and the other is
obligated by virtue of an express bargain to pay a fixed sum.21
20 Salladin v. Mitchell, 42 Neb. 859, 61 N. W. 127 (1894); broseby v.
Williamson, 52 Tenn. 278 (1871). But see The Venango National Bank v.
Taylor, 56 Pa. 14 (1867).
21 Set-off of debit balance and cause of action in favor of customer: Adams
v. Spokane Drug Co., supra note 17 (draft in favor of customer, drawn by
insolvent bank and dishonored by drawee); Green v. McCord, 204 Ala. 364,
85 So. 752 (1920) (claim for indemnity for payment made by customer as
surety for insolvent bank); Taylor v. Cox, supra note 19 ("savings de-
posit"); Lippitt v. Thames Loan & Trust Co., supra note 12 ("savings de-
posit"); Robinson v. Aird, supra note 17 (claim for payment made by cus-
tomer for account of bank) ; Williams v. Johnson, supra note 17 ("savings
deposit"); Miller v. Receiver of Franklin Bank, supra note 17 (bank
notes); Seymour v. Dunham, 24 Hun 93 (N. Y. 1881) (certificate of de-
posit); Fisher v. Davis, 278 Pa. 129, 122 AtI. 224 (1923) (non-fiduciary
special deposit); Bank *of Pennsylvania v. Spangler, 32 Pa. 474 (1859)
(bank notes); Jones v. Piening, 85 Wis. 264, 55 N. W. 413 (1893) (special
deposits, fiduciary and non-fiduciary); Johnston v. Humphrey, 91 Wis. 76,
64 N. W. 317 (1895).
Set-off of credit balance and cause of action in favor of bank: Sichels v.
Herold, 15 Misc. 116, 36 N. Y. Supp. 488 (1895) (note given for accommo-
dation). Cf. Johnson v. Farm & Home Savings and Loan Ass'n, 289 Pac.
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The obligation to pay the balance of the current account arises
from an implied-in-fact bargain which is quite distinct from the
obligation resulting from the express bargain, but the case is as
clear a one for set-off as were the other instances.
To the statement that the receiver or customer may set off
obligations arising from independent obligations there are two
conspicuous exceptions. Both have been formulated to effectuate
the policy underlying statutes regulating banking. In some states,
state banks which receive time deposits in the form of "savings
accounts" are required to invest and keep invested the money
so received in securities earmarked for the savings department
and segregated from the other assets of the bank. In those juris-
dictions, if out of the segregated funds the bank has made a loan
and the customer expressly bargained to repay it, giving his note
and mortgage, against his liability on the note the customer may
not set off his claim for the credit balance of his current account
or his claim for a time deposit in the form of a "savings account,"
or his claim upon any other obligation of the insolvent bank12
To permit the set-off would lessen by the amount of the claim
set off, the value of the assets which, pursuant to the statute,
have been segregated for the "savings" depositors. It should be
observed, however, that this policy does not preclude the set-off
of the customer's claim for a time deposit in the form of a "sav-
ings account" against his obligation to pay the debit balance of
the current account, or against any other of his obligations to
the receiver.2 3 The other exception results from statutes impos-
ing double liability upon stockholders. This liability is created
for the benefit of creditors who are entitled to the distribution of
its full value equally among them. Hence the conclusion that the
customer who is also a stockholder and therefore obligated to
pay upon his stock may not, against this liability, set off a claim
against the estate.24
396 (Kan. 1930) in which the receiver sought to recover assets preferentially
transferred to customer.
2 Lippitt v. Thames Loan & Trust Co., supra note 12; Bassett v. The
City Bank & Trust Co., Conn. Sup. Ct., April 29, 1932; Lawrence v. Lin-
coln Trust Co., 123 Me. 273, 122 Atl. 765 (1923) ; Kelly v. Allen, 239 Mass,
298, 131 N. E. 855 (1921); Tremont Trust Co. v. Baker, 243 Mass. 530,
137 N. E. 915 (1923); Tremont Trust Co. v. C. H. Graham Furniture Co.,
244 Mass. 134, 138 N. E. 330 (1923); Bailey v. Allen, 244 Mass. 499, 138
N. E. 915 (1923); Upham v. Bramwell, supra note 12 (set-off of claim
against commercial department denied but set-off of "savings deposit" per-
mitted); and see Hannon v. Williams, 34 N. J. Eq: 255 (1881).
23 Taylor v. Cox, supra note 19; Lippitt v. Thames Loan & Trust Co.,
supra note 12; Williams v. Johnson, supra note 17.
24 Wingate v. Orchard, 75 Fed. 241 (1896) ; Williams v. Rose, 218 Fed.
898 (1914); Webby v. Spurway, 30 Ariz. 274, 246 Pac. 759 (1916); of. Reid
v. Owensboro Say. Bank & Trust Co., 141 Ky. 444, 132 S. W. 1026 (1911).
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Receiver and Customer Who Is Maker of an Unmatured Note
A second situation in which both bank and customer are obligated
as a result of a loan or discount of the customer's own note is
precisely like the first except that the note has not matured be-
fore the sequestration.
It will be recalled that the loan or discount was not a transac-
tion in which the bank received a quid pro quo but was a bar-
gain, executory on both sides, in which the bank promised to
lend upon demand an agreed sum during an agreed period and
the customer promised to pay the debit balance at the end of
that period, giving his note as security therefor. It will also be
recalled that the content of the customer's obligation after the
sequestration is the same as the content of his obligation before
the sequestration. Thus when the agreed loan period does ex-
pire, but not before, the customer is obligated to pay the receiver
the amount of the debit balance, if there be any. It might be
thought that the amount of the customer's claim against the
estate should be measured by the amount of the bank's obligation
to him, that is, the sum of the amount of the credit balance of
the current account and of the amount which at the time of
sequestration had not been advanced by the bank under its execu-
tory promise in the loan and discount transaction. But the
amount of the customer's claim is instead measured by the credit
balance of the current account alone. The obligation of the bank
to lend beyond this sum was extinguished upon the sequestration
of the bank's assets. It is true that before the sequestration the
customer was, after actual demand, entitled to specific perform-
ance of the bank's promise though that promise was given in
exchange for an unperformed promise and not for a quid pro quo
which has been received. It must be admitted that an argument,
founded upon the absence of a demand, against including in the
amount of the customer's claim against the estate the amount
not yet lent under the executory bargain does not ring true in
the ears of either layman or lawyer. The real ground for not
permitting the customer's claim to include the full amount of the
bank's executory promise to lend is that it would be futile, in a
proceeding for the winding up of a business by liquidating the
assets and distributing the proceeds among creditors, to allow
a proof of claim for an amount which the customer as a borrower
would be obligated to repay to the receiver. The sequestration
is in effect an injunction against the performance of the banls
executory promise which both disallows specific performance and
also precludes the recovery of damages for its breach after the
sequestration. The amount of the customer's claim is, therefore,
measured by that part of the bank's obligation to him which arose
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by virtue of transactions in which the bank had actually received
a quid pro quo.
Thus, if the advances by customer exceeded the advances by
bank so that the balance of the current account was in credit, the
receiver cannot recover from the customer either before or at
the end of the agreed loan period.25 The customer, however, has
a provable claim for the credit balance 20 and may also compel
the return of the note which is being held as security for a non-
existent debit balance.21 But if, on the other hand, the balance
of the current account is in debit, the receiver may, at the ex-
piration of the agreed loan period upon the maturity of the note,
recover the debit balance from the customer.28 Meanwhile until
the debit balance is paid the receiver may retain the note or notes
as security even though the amount of any one exceed the debit
balance.2 The customer, however, may redeem the note or notes
upon payment of the debit balance30
In addition to the problem of determining the direction and
amount of the obligation resulting from the loan or discount, the
receiver will be faced with the question whether in the process
of liquidation unmatured debts of bank or customer may or must
be set off against matured debts of the other. For answer he
must look to the decisions and statutes regulating set-off of inde-
pendent debts in the administration of insolvent estates. If the
obligation of the insolvent is matured and the obligation of the
creditor unmatured, one is set off against the other and the
amount which the receiver may recover or the amount which the
25 Williams v. Rose, supra note 24; Lippitt v. Thames Loan & Trust Co.,
supra note 12; State v. Brobston, supra note 12; Roseville Trust Co. v. Bar-
ney, 89 N. J. L. 550, 99 Atl. 343 (1916) ; In the Matter of Van Allen, supra
note 12; Upham v. Bramwell, supra note 12; Jordon v. Sharlock, 84 Pa.
366 (1877) ; Comfort v. Patterson, 70 Tenn. 670 (1879).
20 Building & Engineering Co. v. Northern Bank, 206 N. Y. 400, 99 N. E.
1044 (1912); Jordon v. Sharlock, supra note 25.
2 Building & Engineering Co. v. Northern Bank, supra note 26,
28 Scott v. Armstrong, 146 U. S. 499, 13 Sup. Ct. 148 (1892) ; Colton v.
Dover Perpetual Building & Loan Ass'n, 90 Md. 85, 45 Atl. 23 (1899);
In the Matter of Van Allen, supra note 12; Fort v. McCulley, 59 Barb. 87
(N. Y. 1870) ; Clute v. Warner, 8 App. Div. 40, 40 N. Y. Supp. 392 (1896) ;
Platt v. Bentley, 20 Am. Law Reg. [11 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.)] 171 (N. Y.
Sup. Ct. 1872); Borough Bank of Brooklyn v. Mulqueen, 70 Misc. 137, 125
N. Y. Supp. 1034 (1910); Butterworth v. Peck, 18 N. Y. Super. Ct. C5
Bosw.] 341 (1859); Skiles v. Houston, 110 Pa. 254, 2 Atl. 30 (1885).
Contra*. M. R. Johnston Coffee Co. v. Page, 157 Atl. 297 (Md. 1931).
29 Supra note 18.
30Supra note 19. Contra: M. R. Johnston Coffee Co. v. Page, supra note
28 (for an explanation of this case see BRANNAN, TnE NEGOTIABLE INSTRU-
MENTS LAW ANNOTATED (4th ed. 1926) 723; Raymond, Suretyship at "Law
Merchant" (1916) 30 HARV. L. RsV. 141; (1925) 38 HARv. L. Rv. 954).
For another interpretation of the N. I. L. in a precisely analogous situation
see Roseville Trust Co. v. Barney, supra note 25; Building and Engineering
Co. v. Northern Bank, supra note 26.
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creditor may prove is the difference.:" For example, if the bank
holds an unmatured note of a customer which it bought in the
open market and the customer holds a matured certificate of
deposit then the one is set off against the other. But if the obliga-
tion of the insolvent is unmatured and the obligation of the
creditor matured the statutes and decisions differ as to whether
or not the amount which the receiver may recover or the credi-
tor prove is the difference between the two claims.12 In some
jurisdictions it is held that if the obligation of the insolvent is
unmatured each party recovers the full amount of his obligation
undiminished by the amount of the other. Thus, if the customer's
obligation to reimburse the bank for advances made under a
letter of credit is due and the customer holds the banls unma-
tured certificate of deposit, whether one of them has a claim for
the difference betwedn the two obligations or whether the re-
ceiver may recover on the letter of credit agreement and the
customer prove for the amount of the certificate of deposit de-
pends upon the jurisdiction in which the question is raised.
Receiver and Accomnodting Party Who Has Signzed the Note
for the Customer's Accomnmzodation
In either of the two situations in which the receiver finds among
the sequestered assets the note of a customer which has been
discounted for him it may appear that the note bears the signa-
ture of an accommodating party. If so, the receiver may choose
to proceed against the surety. It will be recalled that the cus-
tomer's obligation as a party to the note was acquired by the
bank as collateral security for the customer's obligation to pay
the debit balance of the current account at the end of the agreed
loan period. For the same reason the obligation of the accommo-
31McCagg v. Woodman, 28 fl1. 84 (1862) (credit balance and note bought
in open market); Partch v. Boyle, 197 Iowa 1314, 197 N. W. 35 (1924)
(credit balance and rent) ; Mercer v. Dyer, 15 Mont. 317, 39 Pac. 314 (1895)
(credit balance and county warrants); Kilby v. First National Bank, 32
Misc. 370, 66 N. Y. Supp. 579 (1900) (claim for indemnity for paymeiit
made by customer as surety for insolvent bank and debit balance); M ndel
v. Koerner, 149 N. Y. Supp. 455 (Mun. Ct. 1914) (credit balance and rent);
Comfort v. Patterson, 70 Tenn. 670 (1879) (certificate of deposit and note);
Johnson v. City of Aberdeen, 147 Wash. 482, 266 Pac. 707 (1928) (credit
balance and city warrants); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Grays Harbor Co.,
293 Pac. 441 (Wash. 1930) (credit balance and county warrants); Jones
v. Piening, supra note 17 (special deposits, fiduciary and non-fiduciary, and
debit balance); Clark, Set-Off in Cases of Immature Claims in Insolvncy
and Receivership (1920) 34 HARv. L. REV. 178; (1932) 80 U. o PA. L. REV.
420, 421.
- Taylor v. Weir, 63 Ill. App. 82 (1895); Andrews -. North English Sav-
ings Bank of North English, 231 N. W. 293 (Iowa 1930) (unmatured cer-
tificates of deposit and debit balance) ; In the Matter of Van Allen, supra
note 12; Clark, supra note 31; (1932) 80 U. op PA. L. Rnv. 420, 422-426.
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dating party is collateral security for the customer's obligation
to pay the debit balance. The bank, upon the maturity of the
note, ,might have recovered against the accommodating party no
more than the amount of the customer's debit balance. Ordinarily
a pledgee may recover the amount on the face of a negotiable
instrument though the instrument be pledged to secure a lesser
sum. However, if recovery of the full amount will result in cir-
cuity of action the recovery is limited to the amount of the debt
for which the instrument is pledged. If the bank were permitted
to recover the full amount of the note from the accommodating
party it would hold the amount by which the recovery exceeded
the debit balance for the customer who in turn would be under a
duty to reimburse the accommodating party for the full amount
paid by him to the bank. It will also be recalled that upon the
sequestration of the assets the customer, 'whether his note had
or had not then matured, is at maturity obligated to pay the
debit balance of the current account.
Thus, if the balance of the customer's current account were
in debit the receiver can recover from the surety on the note no
more than the amount of the debit balance -1 and the surety upon
payment of this sum can compel the receiver to surrender the
note.34 And if the note has not matured prior to the sequestra-
tion the receiver may not recover until the expiration of the loan
period. But if the balance of the current account were in credit
the receiver can recover nothing,5 and the surety may require
the receiver to cancel his signature.3 0
The limitation of the receiver's recovery against the accommo-
dating party to the amount of the debit balance of the current
account is not an application of rules derived from the cases
deciding when a surety may rely upon set-offs and counterclaims
which would be available to the principal debtor if the creditor
were proceeding against the principal. If it were, doubtless there
would be found the same diversity of decision between receiver
and accommodating party which characterizes that group of
ases. By these decisions if the principal is solvent and there is
no special statutory provision the surety sometimes is, but usu-
3 3 Scott v. Armstrong; Borough Bank of Brooklyn v. Mulqueen; Butter-
worth v. Peck, all supra note 28; Armstrong v. Warner, 49 Ohio St. 376, 31
N. E. 877 (1892); Wilbur v. Mortgage Loan Co., 153 S. C. 14, 149 S. E.
262 (1929). Contra: Hughes v. Garrett, supra note 17; Cosmopolitan Trust
Co. v. S. Vorenberg Co., 245 Mass. 317, 139 N. E. 482 (1923) (for an ex-
planation of this case see BRANNAN; Raymond, both op. cit. supra note 30;
(1925) 38 HARv. L. REv. 954).
34 Wilbur v. Mortgage Loan Co., supra note 33.
35 Bromfield v. Trinidad National Investing Co., 36 F. (2d) 646 (1929);
Meyer v. Hiatt, supra note 12. But see Williams v. Hoebstein, 218 Fed. 896
(1914) and Williams v. Rose, supra note 24.
36 Supra notes 19 and 30.
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ally is not, permitted to plead his principal's set-offs37 If the
principal is insolvent, the insolvency may make a difference and
iesult in permission to the surety to avail himself of the prin-
cipal's set-offs.33 If the assets of the insolvent principal debtor
have been sequestered the intervention of the rights of creditors
of the principal may make a difference. These are the decisions
which would be controlling if, in an action in which the receiver
sought to recover no more than the debit balance, the accommo-
dating party sought to plead by way of set-off or counterclaim
the customer's cause of action on, for example, a certificate of
deposit.
There remains the distinct question whether in a situation in
which the accommodating party himself has a claim against the
insolvent estate, the receiver may recover the full amount of the
customer's debit balance and the surety prove for the full amount
of his claim or whether the amount which the receiver may re-
cover or the customer prove is merely the difference between
the amounts of their claims. This question is obviously a matter
of setting off independent causes of action and its solution de-
pends upon the decisions and statutes regulating the administra-
tion of insolvent estates. It will be observed that the question
is the same as that presented by the situation in which the cus-
tomer who is obligated for the amount of his debit balance has
an independent cause of action against the insolvent estate. But
the two situations are unlike in that the solvency of the customer
which was regarded as immaterial in the situation in which the
parties were bank and customer is a factor of paramount im-
portance in determining whether or not the claims of receiver
and accommodating party may be set off. Thus, if the customer
is solvent the receiver may recover the full amount of the cus-
tomer's debit balance and the accommodating party must prove
for the full amount of his claim.9 But if the customer is insol-
37Niblack v. Feldman, 204 Ill. App. 443 (1917); Armstrong v. Warner,
supra note 33.
is Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Duke, 293 Fed. 661 (1923); Armstrong v.
Warner, supra note 33.
39 In re Garfunkel, 8 F. (2d) 790 (1924) ; New Farmers' Bank's Trustee
v. Young, 19 Ky. L. R. 35, 39 S. W. 46 (1897) ; Bachrach v. Allen, 239 Mass.
272, 131 N. E. 857 (1921) ; Bank of United States v. Braveman, N. Y. Ct.
of Appeals (1932); In re Middle District Bank, 1 Paige 585 (N. Y. 1829);
Borough Bank of Brooklyn v. Mulqueen, supra note 28; Knaffil v. Knoxville
Banking & Trust Co., 128 Tenn. 181, 159 S. W. 838 (1913); Edmonson v.
Thomasson, 112 Va. 326, 71 S. E. 536 (1911); Lamb v. Pannell, 28 W. Va.
663 (1886); and see Stephens v. Schuchmann, 32 Mo. App. 333 (1888).
Contra: Powell v. Mobley, 166 Ga. 163, 142 S. E. 678 (1928); Bank of
United States v. Bilgore, 232 App. Div. 643, 251 N. Y. Supp. 163 (1931)
(based on authority of Bank of United States v. Braveman, 232 App. Div.
640, 251 N. Y. Supp. 160 (1931) which was decided at the same time and
has since been reversed); Carnegie Trust Co. v. Kistler, 89 Misc. 404, 152
N. Y. Supp. 240 (1915); and see Salladin v. Mitchell, supra note 20.
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vent the claims of receiver and accommodating party may, under
certain circumstances, be set off. If the accommodating party
holds a claim which was due at the time of sequestration, as, for
example, a matured certificate of deposit, then, whether or not
his obligation to pay the customer's debit balance was then due,
the two causes of action are set off.40 But if the claim of the'
accommodating party was not due at the time of sequestration
then the situation is doubtless similar to that in which the cus-
tomer held an unmatured claim against the insolvent bank and
doubtless the same difference of opinion should be expected.4
Receiver, Customer and Third Person Whose Bill or Note Was
Discounted for the Customer
A third situation in which both bank and customer are obligated
as a result of a loan or discount is precisely like the first two ex-
cept that the receiver instead of holding the note of the customer
holds a matured or unmatured note indorsed by him. The instru-
ment was made or drawn by a third person and delivered to the
customer for value received from him in the course of a business
transaction.
It will be recalled that, as in the other loan or discount situa-
tions, the bank, by virtue of the implied-in-fact bargain between
the parties, became obligated to lend an agreed sum during an
agreed period and the customer became unconditionally obligated
to pay the debit balance at the end of that period. The instru-
ment, whether the customer indorsed it, indorsed it "without
recourse," or did not indorse it at all, was collateral security for
the customer's obligation to pay the debit balance. Unlike the
other loan and discount situations, the customer's obligation on
the instrument, if he has indorsed it, is conditional upon present-
ment and notice of dishonor. But want of presentment and no-
tice, whatever its effect upon the obligation of the customer as
indorser may be, does not extinguish his unconditional obliga-
tion to pay the debit balance. Nor, on the other hand, does the
making of presentment and the giving of notice increase the
amount of the customer's obligation to pay the debit balance for
which the note is collateral. As in the other loan and discount
situations, upon the sequestration of the assets, the customer
If the accommodating party has been indemnified he may not set off a
claim which he holds against the bank though the principal debtor is insol-
vent. In re Middle District Bank, supra; Knaffl v. Knoxville Banking and
Trust Co., 130 Tenn. 336, 170 S. W. 476 (1914).
40 Streeter v. Junker, 230 Ill. App. 366 (1923) ; Kibby v. First Nat, Bank
of Carthage, supra note 31; Davis v. Industrial Mfg. Co., 114 N. C. 321, 19
S. E. 371 (1894); Ex parte Rice, 159 S. E. 492 (S. C. 1931); (1932) 41
YALE L. J. 881.
41Supra note 32; (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 881.
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either continues to be obligated to pay the debit balance of the
current account or has a provable claim for the credit balance.
Thus, if the current account is in credit the receiver has no
cause of action against the customer 42 but the latter may prove
for the credit balance 43 and compel the receiver to surrender the
note.44 But if there is a debit balance, the receiver can recover
its amount 45 from the customer who by paying may redeem the
note.41 Until the debit balance is paid the receiver may retain as
collateral security the note upon which the maker is obligated.?
Once the amount of the customer's obligation to the receiver
or the customer's claim against the estate has been determined,
then, the problems of set-off must be faced. These problems and
their solution are no different in the situation under discussion
than they were in the one in which the receiver held the cus-
tomer's own note.
The proposition that in the case of the discount of a third
person's note, the obligation of the maker is collateral security
for the customer's obligation to pay the debit balance of the
current account is not at all inconsistent with the conclusion that
the receiver may recover the full amount of the note from the
maker even if the existence of a credit balance discloses that
the customer-principal debtor is not obligated g In any event
the bank is a holder of the note to which there is no defense. If
the maker has no defense against the payee, his indorsee,
whether agent, donee, or whatever, may recover the full amount
of the note. It is true the receiver would, under the circum-
stances supposed, hold the amount received for the customer,
just as would any pledgee who has realized upon the collateral
more than is necessary to satisfy the principal debt.
The conclusion that the receiver may recover from the maker
the face amount of the note, whatever the balance of the current
42 Balbach v. Frelinghausen, 15 Fed. 675 (1883) (check); Yardley v.
Clothier, 51 Fed. 506 (1892); O'Connor v. Brandt, 12 App. Div. 596, 42
N. Y. Supp. 1079 (1897); Williams v. Coleman, 190 N. C. 368, 129 S. E.
818 (1925); see Arnold v. Niess, 1 Walker 115 (Pa. 1879).
43 Williams v. Coleman, supra note 42.
4 Balbach v. Frelinghausen; O'Connor v. Brandt; Williams v. Coleman,
all supra note 42.
-4 Bromfield v. Cochran, 86 Colo. 486, 283 Pac. 45 (1929) ; Curtis v. David-
son, 215 N. Y. 395, 109 N. E. 481 (1915); People v. Canal Street Bank,
6 Mlisc. 319, 26 N. Y. Supp. 794 (1893); see Laubach v. Liebert, 87 Pa. 55
(1878). But see Newberry v. Trowbridge, 13 Mich. 263 (1865); Stephens
v. Schuchmann, supra note 39, criticized in Yardley v. Clothier, mpr7a
note 42.
-6 People v. Canal Street Bank, supra note 45. But the customer may not
redeem by offering to set-off a "savings deposit." Bryant v. Williams, 16 F.
(2d) 159 (1926).
47 Bryant v. Williams, supra note 46.
48 Cosmopolitan Trust Co. v. Lyons, 244 Mass. 115, 138 N. E. 325 (1923).
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account, is perfectly consistent with the proposition that the re-
ceiver can recover against an accommodating party upon a note
made by the customer no more than the amount of the debit bal-
ance. That proposition is derived from the rule against circuity
of action. The receiver who recovered the face amount of the
note from the accommodating party would be accountable to the
customer for the surplus over the debit balance, and the customer
would in turn be obligated to reimburse the accommodating
party. But if, as in the case under discussion, the customer ac-
quired the note from the maker for value in a business transac-
tion, the customer is not obligated to reimburse the maker. On
the contrary the maker was obligated on the note to the customer.
If the situation under discussion be changed by supposing that
by reason of fraud and deceit the maker of the note has a defense
against the customer, then the receiver may recover from the
maker no more than the debit balance.49 This result is not in
49 Bromfield v. Cochran, supra note 45; Drovers National Bank v. Blue,
110 Mich. 31, 67 N. W. 1105 (1896); Union National Bank of Columbus v.
Winsor, 101 Minn. 470, 112 N. W. 999 (1907); Lionberger v. Kinealy, 13
Mo. App. 4 (1882); Port Washington State Bank v. Polonia Phonograph
Co., 180 Wis. 71, 192 N. W. 472 (1923). See also Tatum v. Commercial
Bank and Trust Co., 185 Ala. 249, 64 So. 561 (1914); National Bank of
Commerce v. Morgan, 207 Ala. 65, 92 So. 10 (1921); Colorado National
Bank v. Western Grain Co., 218 Ala. 339, 118 So. 588 (1928); Kansas City
Southern Ry. Co. v. First National Bank of Ft. Smith, 174 Ark. 447, 295
S. W. 357 (1927); Ashley & Rumelin v. Brady, 41 Idaho 160, 238 Pac. 314
(1925); First State Bank and Trust Company v. First National Bank of
Canton, 314 Ill. 269, 145 N. E. 382 (1924); Rawlins County State Banl
v. Rummel, 114 Kan. 597, 220 Pac. 255 (1923) ; New Jersey Title Guarantee
& Trust Co. v. Knowlton Bros., 239 Mich. 404, 214 N. W. 195 (1927);
American Surety Co. of New York v. Industrial Savings Bank, 242 Mich.
581, 219 N. W. 689 (1928); Savings Bank of Kewanee v. Schaal, 156 Minn.
424, 19,5 N. W. 141 (1923); Union National Bank v. Fox, 9 S. W. (2d) 1070
(Mo. App. "1928); Hightstown Trust Co. v. American Equity Co., 7 N. J.
Misc. 135, 144 At]. 599 (1929); Citizens State Bank v. Cowles, 180 N. Y.
346, 73 N. E. 33 (1905); Batte National Bank v. Sonnenstrahl, 249 N. Y.
391, 164 N.-E. 327 (1928) ; Cedar Rapids National Bank v. Snoozy, 55 N. P.
655, 215 N. W. 96 (1927); Sperlin v. Peninsular Loan & Discount Co., 103
S. W. 232 (Tex. 1907); Merchant's & Mechanic's Savings Bank v. Haddix,
97 W. Va. 536, 125 S. E. 362 (1924). Centra: Lincoln Alliance Bank v.
Landers, 298 Fed. 79 (1924), cert. den. 265 U. S. 595, 44 Sup. Ct. 638
(1924); Drilling v. First National Bank, 43 Kan. 201, 23 Pac. 94 (1890);
Fredonia National Bank v. Tommei, 131 Mich. 655. 92 N. W. 348 (1902);
First National Bank of Appleton v. Court, 183 Wis. 203, '197 N, W. 798
(1924).
Of course, if the debit balance of the current account is equal to or
greater than the amount of the instrument, the bank may recover its face.
Sherrill v. Merchant's & Mechanic's Trust & Savings Bank, 195 Ala, 176,
70 So. 723 (1916); Pasadena National Bank v. Shorten, 96 Cal. App. 451,
274 Pac. 358 (1929); First National Bank of Fresno v. Corcoran, 105 Cal.
App. 116, 286 Pac. 1105 (1930); Anglo California Trust Co. v. French
American Bank, 291 Pac. 621 (Cal. App. 1930); City Deposit Bank v.
Green, 130 Iowa 384, 106 N. W. 942 (1906); Smouse v. Waterloo Savings
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conflict with the proposition that the receiver may recover the
face amount from a maker who has no defense even if there be
a credit balance, but is explained, as is the restriction of the
amount of recovery against an accommodating party on a note
of a customer, by the rule against circuity of action.
It may be that the maker, from whom the receiver may re-
cover the full amount of the note acquired by the insolvent bank
from the payee-customer (or the debit balance if there is a de-
fense to the note), is also a customer and has an independent
claim against the insolvent estate, for example, for the credit
balance of his own current account or on a certificate of deposit.
Whether the maker must prove for the full amount of his claim
or whether the amount which he may recover is the difference
between the amounts of their claims are questions the solution of
which depends upon the statutes and decisions regulating the ad-
ministration of insolvent estates °0
In the situation under discussion the instrument which the
bank received from its customer was the note of a third person.
Had the instrument been the bill or acceptance of a third person,
the results would be the same. It is perhaps less obvious that the
legal relations between bank and customer would be the same
were the check of a third person taken, not for collection, but
under an implied-in-fact bargain to make advances to the cus-
tomer up to its amount. That the check is payable on demand,
is a token calling for the immediate paynent of money, and is
promptly liquidated, obscures the fact that the transaction was
in fact a loan, that is to say, a "loan or discount." The customer
Bank, 198 Iowa 306, 199 N. W. 350 (1924) ; Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v.
McGrath, 239 Mich. 404, 214 N. W. 195 (1927); Cairo National Bank v.
Blanton Co., 287 S. W. 839 (Mo. App. 1926); First National Bank of
Minneapolis v. Wells County, 54 N. D. 502, 209 N. W. 962 (1926); Bank
of California v. Young, 123 Ore. 95, 260 Pac. 227 (1927); McCauley v.
Morris Plan Bank of Va., 155 Va. 777, 156 S. E. 418 (1931) ; Old National
Bank of Spokane v. Gibson, 105 Wash. 578, 179 Pac. 117 (1919).
In a few jurisdictions the bank may recover the amount on the face of
the instrument on the ground that the bank's promise to extend credit is of
itself value. E:x parte Richdale, L. R. 19 Ch. Div. 409 (1881); Royal Bank
of Scotland v. Tottenham, 2 Q. B. 715 (1894); Bank of British North
America v. Warren Co., 19 Ont. L. Rep. 257 (1909); Blacker v. Nat. Bank
of Baltimore, 151 Md. 514, 135 Atl. 383 (1926).
50 Set-off allowed: Jarvis v. Hammons, 32 Ariz. 124, 256 Pac. 362 (1927)
on rehearing, 32 Ariz. 318, 257 Pac. 985 (1927) (credit balance and county
warrants); Leonard v. Taylor, 39 S. W. (2d) 704 (Ark. 1931) (credit bal-
ance and note); Aab v. French, 279 S. W. 435 (Mo. App. 1926) (credit
balance and note); Receivers v. The Paterson Gas Light Co., 23 N. J. Eq.
283 (1852) (bank notes, credit balance and acceptance); Graham v. Proc-
torville Warehouse, 189 N. C. 533, 127 S. E. 540 (1925) (credit balance
and note).
Set-off denied: Cosmopolitan Trust Co. v. Golub, 252 Mlass. 574, 147 N. E.
847 (1925).
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becomes obligated to pay the debit balance at the end of the loan
period, that is, upon notice, and the check plays the part of col-
lateral security for the debit balance.r1
Receiver, Customer, Accommodating Party, and Third Person if
the Bill or Note After Its Discount Has Been Earmarked
for the Savings Department
The separate investment of funds derived from time deposits in
the form of "savings accounts" is, in some states, required of
state banks. And the investment of funds of the savings de-
partment in instruments previously discounted in the course of
the bank's commercial business is not uncommon. In the discus-
sion of the situations in which both bank and customer become
obligated* by virtue of a loan or discount it has been assumed
that the note or other instrument which was taken as collateral
had not thereafter been earmarked and placed among the segre-
gated assets of the savings department. If the note had prior to
the sequestration been segregated in some manner satisfying the
statute requiring the segregation of the assets of the savings de-
partment,5 2 nevertheless the legal relations of bank, customer,
accommodating party and third person, with two exceptions de-
rived from the statutes are the same as if the note had not been
earmarked. Both exceptions are devised to enable the receiver to
realize for the "savings" depositors the face amount, i.e., the
apparent value of the notes and other securities which in pursu-
ance of the statute have been set aside for their protection. The
first of them is that the receiver may recover the full amount
of the note whatever the balance of the current account between
the customer and bank may be.53 The second is that against his
obligation on the note neither customer nor third person may
set off any claim he may have against the insolvent bank."'
-5 Supra p. 1114.
'52 Bassett v. The City Bank and Trust Co. (Conn. Sup, Ct., April 29,
1932).
53 Bassett v. The City Bank and Trust Co., supra note 52; Lawrence v.
Lincoln County Trust Co., 123 Me. 273, 122 Atl. 765 (1923); Bachrach v.
Allen, 239 Mass. 272, 131 N. E. 857 (1921); Cosmopolitan Trust Co. v.
Rosenbush, 239 Mass. 305, 131 N. E. 858 (1921); Tremont Trust Co. v.
C. H. Graham Furniture Co., 244 Mass. 134, 138 N. E. 330 (1923); Bler-
inger-Hanauer Co. v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., 247 Mass. 73, 141 N. E. 566
(1923); Cosmopolitan Trust Co. v. Suffolk Knitting Mills, 247 Mass. 530,
143 N. E. 138 (1924); Cosmopolitan Trust Co. v. Leonard Watch Co., 249
Mass. 14, 143 N. E. 827 (1924); Dole v. Chattabriga, 82 N. H. 396, 134
Atl. 347 (1926).
"The theory of the interveners is that the assets required to be segregated
do not include notes of depositors at their full face, but at their face less
deposits of the makers and indorsers.
"For example, a bank has a note for $5,000 given by A., who has a deposit
of $2,000. The bank segregates the note as security for savings deposits.
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Doubtless to the extent that the receiver recovers more than he
would have recovered from the customer were the action for the
debit balance the customer, by way of reimbursement is given a
claim against the insolvent estatess
Rediscounting Bank, Receiver, Customer, Accommodating Party
and Third Person -if the Bill or Note Has Bccn Rcdiscounted
Prior to the sequestration the insolvent bank may have exercised
its privileged power to borrow by way of loan or discount at its
bank upon the notes or other items which it obtained in the
course of loan or discount transactions with its own customers.
The ransactions in the course of which the insolvent bank re-
discounted these items are similar to those loan and discount
transactions in which the insolvent bank obtained from its cus-
tomers the notes, bills and checks of third persons; and the legal
relations between insolvent bank and rediscounting bank result-
ing therefrom are like those between bank and customer in the
situation referred to. Thus the insolvent bank came under an
obligation to pay the rediscounting bank the amount of its debit
balance and the various items were collateral security. Obviously
such transactions also result in legal relations between the redis-
counting bank and the persons obligated on the items redis-
counted. Examination of these legal relations becomes of real
importance upon the insolvency of the borrowing bank and the
sequestration of its assets.
At the outset it should be observed that unless there has been
a misappropriation by the insolvent bank which gives rise to a
defense in favor .of the parties obligated upon the rediscounted
items 5Q--and certainly the rediscount alone is not a misappro-
priation-the rediscounting bank may recover the full amount
of the item against any party who was obligated to pay the full
amount to the customer. As to the customer himself, or a person
who signed for his accommodation, or one who had a defense
against the customer, whether or not and how much the redis-
counting bank may recover depends upon two factors. They are
the state of the current account between the two banks and the
state of the current account between the insolvent bank and the
"The theory of the interveners is that such segregated note is today se-
curity for $3,000 only, though tomorrow, if the deposit is withdrawn, the
security may become $5,000, and the next day, if the maker should deposit
$5,000, the security would utterly vanish. In the last analysis our problem
is to determine the meaning of the word 'assets' as used in the statute above
quoted." Lawrence v. Lincoln Country Trust Co., supra at 76G.
54 Dole v. Chattabriga, supra note 53.
-5 Cosmopolitan Trust Co. v. Suffolk Knitting Mills, su~pra note 53.
56 Puget Sound State Bank v. Washington Paving Co., 94 Wash. 504, 162
Pac. 870 (1917).
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customer from whom it acquired the rediscounted item. If the
debit balance of the current account between the insolvent bank
and the rediscounting bank is equal to or greater than the amount
of the items rediscounted then the rediscounting bank may re-
cover the full amount of the note from the person obligated upon
it. Even if the debit balance is less than the amount of the re-
discounted items which are collateral security therefor, the
rediscounting bank may nevertheless recover the full amount
upon any one or more of them until it has realized an amount
equal to the debit balance.,8 But if there is no debit balance in
the current account between the two banks or if the rediscount-
ing bank has been reimbursed in an amount equal to the debit
balance as, for example, where the rediscounting bank has al-
ready recovered on some items the amount of the debit balance,
then the rediscounting bank cannot recover more than the re-
ceiver could recover from the person on the rediscounted item."
In other words, if the rediscounting bank has no beneficial in-
terest as pledgee, the recovery against a person on the redis-
counted item depends upon the existence of a debit balance in
the current account of the customer from whom the insolvent
bank acquired the item. This result is derived from the rule
against circuity of action. If there was no debit balance between
the two banks or if the rediscounting bank has already realized
a sufficient amount to reimburse itself, any amount which it
would recover would be held for the receiver.
It will be observed that if there is a debit balance in the cur-
rent account between the two banks so that the rediscounting
bank may recover the full amount of the rediscounted item from
a person obligated thereon, such person may b6 obligated to pay
an amount which he would not have had to pay or a greater
amount than he would have had to pay if the item had not been
rediscounted. This result would follow if the balance of the cur-
rent account between customer and insolvent bank were not in
debit or if the debit balance were less than the amount of the
57 Stadler v. First National Bank of Helena, 22 Mont. 190, 56 Pac. 111
(1899); Suter v. City National Bank, 12 S. W. (2d) 1037 (Tex. Civ. App.
1928).
5s Balbach v. Frelinghausen, supra note 42 (semblo); Leach v. City-
Commercial Savings Bank, 219 N. W. 497, 501 (Iowa 1928) (svmblo);
Philler v. Woodfall & Bro., 2 Pa. Dist. 390 (1893). But see First National
Bank of San Francisco v. Nye County, 38 Nev. 123, 145 Pac. 932 (1914);
Live Stock State Bank v. Locke, 277 S. W. 405 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
Obviously a cause of action against the insolvent bank may not be set off
against the rediscounting bank, Munger v. Albany City National Bank, 85
N. Y. 580 (1881).
59 Burnham v. Merchants' Exchange Bank, 92 Wis. 277, 66 N. W. 510
(1896); Merchants' Exchange Bank v. Fuldner, 92 Wis. 415, 66 N. V. 691
(1896). See, First National Bank of Rocky Ford v. Lewis, 67 Colo. 124,
139 Pac. 1102 (1914); Bodley v. Bowman, 131 Kan. 741, 293 Pac. 740
(1930); Puget Sound Bank v. Washington Paving Co., supra note 56.
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note. In such a situation the person who is thus subjected to a
liability secures, by way of reimbursement, a claim for an equal
amount against the assets of the insolvent bank.-
It may be that the person obligated upon the rediscounted item
is a customer of the rediscounting bank and has an independent
cause of action against it. Whether or not the amount of the
claim may be set off against the claim of the rediscounting bank
on the rediscounted item is a question the solution of which de-
pends upon the decisions and statutes regulating the adminis-
tration of insolvent estates.
What the legal relations between rediscounting and insolvent
bank are has already been suggested. Except for the fact that as
between the two banks it is the customer-bank (the borrowing
bank) and not the banker-bank (the rediscounting bank) whose
assets have been sequestered the legal relations would be substan-
tially the same as in the situation in which the customer had
given the bank an instrument of a third person. The rediscount-
ing transaction, in addition to creating legal relations between
the borrowing and the rediscounting bank and between the re-
discounting bank and the parties to the rediscounted items, also
affected the legal relations between the insolvent bank or its re-
ceiver and the persons on the items. If subsequent to the seques-
tration the receiver redeems the item, the legal relations between
receiver and any person on the note is exactly the same as if the
item had always remained in the bank's portfolio.6 ' What those
relations are has already been described. But if the rediscounted
item has not been redeemed then any person who is required to
pay the rediscounting bank an amount which he would not have
to pay the receiver or which exceeds the amount which he would
have to pay the receiver is entitled to a claim for an equal amount
against the assets of the insolvent estate.2-
Of course the possibility should not be overlooked that prior
to the sequestration the insolvent bank may have sold in the open
market notes, acceptances or other items received from its cus-
tomers by way of loan or discount. But this possibility is seldom
actualized. Realization on such items is almost always by way
of loan or discount at the bank's bank. Doubtless were there such
a sale it would not be a breach of duty on the part of the bank; c3
and the receipt of the price would be an advance upon the cur-
rent account between the bank and the customer from whom the
item was received.
60 Hall v. Burrell, 22 Colo. App. 278, 124 Pac. 751 (1912); Leach v.
City-Commercial Savings Bank, supra note 58; In re Bank of Minnesota,
71 Minn. 394, 73 N. W. 1096 (1898); Merchants Ice & Fuel Co. v. Holland
Banking Co., 8 S. W. (2d) 1030 (Mlo. App. 1928).
61 Clute v. Warner, supra note 28.
62Supra note 60.
c3 Puget Sound State Bank v. Washington Paving Co., supra note 56.
